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The international monetary system that was designed at the Bretton 
Woods Conference in 1944 reflected professional views on the defects 
of the arrangements that had prevailed in the 1930s. Protectionist trade 
policies, exchange controls, and competitive currency depreciations’ 
of the pre-World  War I1 period were the cautionary experiences to be 
avoided by the postwar world. Removal of controls on trade and pay- 
ments  under a system of  fixed  exchange  rates,  with  adjustment of 
parities limited to “fundamental” disequilibrium in the balance of pay- 
ments, accordingly were the goals of the system created by the dele- 
gates to the conference.  Exchange rates  were to be pegged  within 
narrow margins to the dollar. Countries would buy or sell dollars in 
the foreign exchange market to keep their currencies from appreciating 
or depreciating more than  1%  from parity. The United States in turn 
would undertake to convert dollars into gold or the reverse at a fixed 
price of $35  an ounce. The International Monetary Fund, to which each 
member subscribed 25% of its quota in gold or 10% of its net official 
reserves of gold and dollars, whichever was smaller, was established 
by the terms of the Bretton Woods charter. It was expected that lending 
facilities of the Fund would be available to supplement the members’ 
gold and foreign exchange reserves to provide  them liquidity when 
their  balances-of-payments  were  temporarily  in  deficit  on  current 
account. 
The establishment of par values for currencies was an important item 
on the Fund’s agenda. Of  our sample of countries, Canada, France, 
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States declared 
their par values in December 1946, Germany and Japan in 1953, and 
Italy not until 1960. Some of these parities were short-lived. An abor- 
tive attempt at convertibility of  sterling in  1947 ended in September 
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1949, when the pound was devalued. The Netherlands thereupon de- 
valued the guilder, and France, which had had  separate rates for fi- 
nancial  and commercial transactions, unified  them, depreciating the 
franc vis-5-vis sterling. 
The pegged exchange-rate system that was created collapsed in 1971.* 
Following futile efforts to restore it, in 1973 governments reluctantly 
turned to managed floating exchange rates. In both regimes, the United 
States served  as  the reserve-currency  country,  other countries pri- 
marily holding dollar assets among their international reserves. 
Discussion of the institutions of the international monetary system 
is instructive for all the theoretical channels of international transmis- 
sion of price change. One of these is completely monetary in nature 
and is therefore directly affected by the character of the international 
monetary system; the other three are nonmonetary, or in one instance 
only partially monetary,  and hence may be only indirectly affected. 
The four channels  are (1)  international  money flows as a result  of 
international payments imbalances that affect the growth of national 
money supplies and eventually rates of price change; (2) direct effects 
on national prices and interest rates through international arbitrage of 
prices of goods and services or of interest rates as a result either of 
changes in the world quantity of money and prices or of cost factors 
independent of monetary conditions; (3) shifts in foreign demand for a 
country’s output that affect its prices; (4)  effects on prices of changes 
in international basic commodity supplies. Some comments on each of 
the channels follow. 
1. The money-flow channel was undoubtedly available during the 
postwar period. For the moment consider only the non-reserve-currency 
countries in the international monetary system. 
Under a pegged exchange-rate system, central banks must buy from 
or sell to their nationals foreign exchange, according as countries face 
a surplus or a deficit in the balance of payments. Central banks may 
also choose to do so under a managed floating exchange-rate regime. 
Whenever a central bank buys foreign exchange, it issues newly created 
high-powered money-usable  as reserves by banks or currency by the 
public-just  as if it had purchased government securities in an open 
market operation or bankers’ promissory notes through discounting. 
Conversely, a sale of foreign exchange destroys high-powered money 
just as does a reduction in the central bank’s portfolio of securities or 
discounts. For this reason, a balance-of-payments surplus is a source 
of increase, a balance-of-payments deficit a source of decrease in high- 
powered money in a strictly arithmetic, or accounting, sense. If, how- 
ever, the central bank  offsets (sterilizes) the effect  of  a balance-of- 
payments surplus by reducing its portfolio of domestic securities and 
discounts, or increasing it less than it otherwise would, there is no 335  Evolution of the International Monetary System 
effect on  the growth rate of high-powered money. The sources of growth 
in high-powered money then are flows of international reserves and 
domestic credit creation by the central bank. It was thus possible for 
a non-reserve-currency country either to accept imported inflation or 
deflation, or for a time to resist such an outcome by sterilizing under 
pegged exchange rates.3 Under floating rates, the country had the ad- 
ditional option of  varying its exchange rate to protect its price level. 
For the U.S., the reserve-currency country, the effect of deficits in 
its balance  of  payments  had  no necessary  contractionary  effect  on 
Federal Reserve policies under either exchange system. The acquisition 
of dollars by foreign central banks did not reduce U.S. high-powered 
money. Dollars were either credited to the balance of those banks at 
Federal  Reserve banks  or else committed to the purchase of  U.S. 
Treasury debt. Until March 1968,  the gold requirement to which Federal 
Reserve notes were subject may have served as a constraint, but once 
abolished there was no legal limitation on the creation of high-powered 
money or  money-supply growth, even after the 1970s, when the Federal 
Reserve system began specifying targets for growth rates of money. 
Until U.S.  monetary policy shifted to an inflationary course in the 
mid-l960s,  deficits  in  the  U.S.  balance  of  payments  provided  the 
rest of the world with desired dollars. After the shift occurred, the de- 
fense of sterilizing undesired additions to dollar holdings as the U.S. 
balance of payments deteriorated was eventually overwhelmed by the 
magnitude of the required operation. Given the commitment to pegged 
exchange rates that surplus countries were reluctant to break by revalu- 
ing, dollars increased their high-powered money stocks and inflation 
rates. In the absence of such a commitment and the adoption of flexible 
exchange rates, short-run independence of national high-powered money 
stocks is in~reased.~ 
2. The operation of the arbitrage channels of transmission requires 
a high degree of, and in the extreme perfect, substitutability of  goods 
and financial assets among co~ntries.~  Applied to the goods markets, 
the perfect-substitutability view is usually described as the “law of one 
price level.” Another approach stresses the effects of changes in wages, 
external prices, and productivity on the two sectors of tradable versus 
nontradable goods which characterize open economies. The law of one 
price level, or the “goods arbitrage approach,” emphasizes the impact 
of world monetary growth on the rise in prices; the second approach 
emphasizes “sructural”  factors that allow no such role for monetary 
conditions.  Restrictions on international trade  and capital flows ob- 
viously block the operation of this channel, which denies the degree 
of  autonomy to individual countries  attributed  to them by the first 
channel under fixed exchange rates. Even if international equalizing of 
tradable goods prices is assumed, inflation rates can differ between 336  Anna J. Schwartz 
countries if relative prices of traded and nontraded goods vary. Under 
flexible exchange rates, transmission  of  a  different sort may  occur 
because an immediate change in the foreign exchange value of domestic 
money, as a result of expectations of future domestic monetary policy, 
will affect domestic money prices of imports and tradable goods and 
thus the domestic inflation rate.6 For the alternative approach, exchange- 
rate changes may provide a signal to price and wage setters of changes 
in economic conditions. 
3. Monetary growth plays no direct role in the operation of this or 
the following channel. Downward shifts in foreign demand for a coun- 
try’s output lead to declines in prices, output, and incomes, through a 
contractionary multiplier effect; upwards shifts, to increases in prices, 
output, and incomes, through an expansionary multiplier effe~t.~  This 
channel may be important under fixed exchange rates for particular 
countries, for example, the effects of U.S. real income changes on the 
demand for Canadian exports, or of German real income changes on 
the demand for Austrian exports, but not necessarily so for the trans- 
mission from the U.S. to European countries. Floating exchange rates 
may decrease the magnitude of the effects through this channel. 
4. Transmission through this channel occurs because the rise in prices 
of basic commodities is viewed as entering either as supply components 
of products initially unaffected and raising their prices also or  by pulling 
up the prices of substitute domestic inputs. Prices in all countries are 
affected, the effect depending on the input weights of these commod- 
ities in each economy.  Some proponents of the importance of  this 
channel also view exchange-rate changes as affecting export and import 
prices of basic commodities. 
Although thus far only the pegged and managed floating exchange- 
rate regimes have been mentioned, it is useful to distinguish four sub- 
periods in the evolution of the international monetary system from 1955 
to date: (1) the preconvertibility phase for nondollar currencies, 1955- 
58; (2) the heyday  of  the Bretton Woods dollar-exchange standard, 
1959-67; (3) the weakening and ensuing collapse of the Bretton Woods 
arrangements, 1968-73;  (4) the managed floating exchange-rate phase, 
1973 to date. 
For each of the subperiods we shall summarize developments that 
relate to the channels of international transmission of price change. 
14.1  Preconvertibility, 1955-58 
In 1955, when our data begin, postwar recovery in Europe was well 
under way. Wartime destruction and disruption in Europe and Asia left 
the countries there with limited productive capacity and swelled the 
immediate postwar demand for U.S. exports. Restrictions against dol- 337  Evolution of the International Monetary System 
lar transactions  were widespread,  and multiple exchange rates were 
not unusual. In the postwar years before  1955, important steps had 
been taken to develop a system of multilateral trade and payments for 
Western European countries.  Of  these, the most significant was the 
establishment in the summer of  1950, with U.S.  support, of the Eu- 
ropean Payments Union (EPU). Before 1950, the conduct of trade and 
payments among members of the EPU as well as with non-European 
countries was on a bilateral basis. By contrast, under the EPU, every 
month  the multilateral  net  debtor-creditor  position  of  each member 
with respect to other members was determined. The dollar served as 
the unit of account, and each European currency was pegged at a fixed 
dollar parity with no band of  admissible variation. Receipts and pay- 
ments were expressed as claims against the clearing union, debtors 
paying a gradually increasing fraction of their deficits in gold or dollars, 
with creditor countries extending the balance as a loan to the EPU. 
Maximum credit lines for debtor countries were imposed, so that cred- 
itor countries were assured of eventual payment in gold or dollars. 
Paralleling the adoption of the clearing union, a trade liberalization 
program among members advanced. In trade with the United States, 
however, European countries applied discriminatory tariff and quota 
restrictions, which the United States did not protest, in order to enable 
them to accumulate gold and dollar assets. It was expected that the 
dollar gap problem, which in 1955 was widely regarded as a long-term 
one, would thereby be mitigated. 
In private gold markets until 1953, the price of gold was at a premium, 
but the IMF required monetary authorities to refrain from selling gold 
at premium prices. In March  1954, several months after the premium 
had  been eliminated, reflecting balance  of  supply and  demand, the 
London gold market reopened. For the rest of the decade the price of 
gold in private markets remained at $35 an ounce. 
Faced with deficits in its current account in 1957-58, France imposed 
import restrictions, devalued at the end of 1958, and borrowed mainly 
from the United States, supplemented by EPU and IMF credits, which 
were conditioned on a ceiling on public expenditures and the budget 
deficit, as well as restrictive monetary policy by the Banque de France. 
Until 1958, all foreign exchange transactions required the approval 
of central banks, which were the agents under the EPU for arranging 
settlements. They were thus well positioned to maintain exchange con- 
trols and payments restrictions. With the dissolution of the EPU on 24 
December 1958, fifteen Western European countries (including the five 
in our sample) made their currencies convertible for current transac- 
tions.  It was not until  1961, however, that restrictions  against U.S. 
exports were removed. Most countries maintained strict controls against 
capital outflows.  Only Germany  in  1957  authorized  its residents  to 338  Anna J. Schwartz 
export capital in any form anywhere in the world and permitted non- 
residents to convert the proceeds of capital transactions in D-marks 
into any other currency. 
Japan’s recovery from the war was less rapid than that of the Western 
European countries. Its current account remained in deficit until the 
mid-l960s, and it continued exchange and capital flow restrictions until 
1964. 
Canada enjoyed special status in the international system. Although 
the IMF, in line with the prevailing U.S. view, set fixed exchange rates 
as the monetary regime par excellence, it tolerated the decision made 
by Canada in 1950 to float its dollar. Canada did not revert to a fixed 
rate until  1962. The reason for floating was to resist the inflationary 
effects that U.S. capital inflows produced under fixed exchange rates.* 
14.2  The Heyday of  the Bretton Woods Dollar-Exchange 
Standard, 1959-67 
With the return of many European currencies to convertibility in 
1958, the achievement of the Bretton Woods conception of international 
monetary normalcy seemed only a matter of time. The outflow of dol- 
lars in U.S. official aid, military spending, and private investment, and 
economic recovery in Europe and Japan had enabled foreigners to add 
to their holdings of dollars and gold. Apart from the 1950-51  Korean 
War upsurge, U.S. prices were generally stable until the middle of the 
1960s, and their rate of rise generally lower than in the rest of the world 
(table 14.1). Money supplies in the rest of  the world (except in the 
U.K.) grew at a faster rate than in the U.S. (table 14.2). 
Part of the difference between this generally faster monetary growth 
in the rest of the world than in the United States was not reflected in 
a difference in inflation rates. Real income growth in general was much 
more rapid in Europe and Japan, which were still recovering from the 
war. Furthermore in some of these countries at least the income elas- 
Table 14.1  Quarterly Rates of  Change of Consumer Prices at Annual Rates 
(percent per year) 
Perioda  CAb  FR  GE  IT  JA  NE  UK  US 
19551-581V  2.02  5.37  2.05  2.01  0.88  3.32  3.75  2.04 
1967IV-731  4.13  5.57  4.45  4.58  5.87  6.17  6.86  4.58 
19731-76IV  8.85  10.68  4.89  16.09  13.19  8.92  16.36  7.95 
1958IV-671V  2.07  3.54  2.41  3.61  4.99  3.32  2.86  1.73 
=All rates are computed from the first quarter of each period to the quarter which ends 
the period.  Periods mark changes in international monetary institutions. 
bThroughout this volume the following country mnemonics are used: CA, Canada; FR, 
France; GE, Germany; IT, Italy; JA, Japan; NE, Netherlands; UK, United  Kingdom; 
US, United States. 339  Evolution of the International Monetary System 
Table 14.2  Quarterly Rates of  Change of  Money'  at Annual Rates 
(percent per year) 
Periodb  CA  FR  GE  IT  JA  NE  UK  us 
19551-58IV  5.67  8.74  10.52  11.96  17.11  5.27  -0.46  3.34 
1958IV-67IV  6.79  12.15  8.01  13.26  17.41  7.90  6.00  5.83 
1967IV-731  10.97  9.40  12.75  14.02  18.11  11.98  11.09  8.09 
19731-761V  16.21  12.99  5.07  19.29  13.16  15.01  11.52  8.62 
aMoney is  defined as currency plus adjusted demand and  time deposits held by  the 
public. 
bAll rates of change computed from the first quarter of each subperiod to the quarter 
which ends the subperiod. 
ticity of demand for money was higher than in the U.S. (See Gandolfi 
and Lothian, 1983, for estimates.) That some difference in inflation was 
actually maintained over long periods without devaluations may be due 
to changes in the relative prices of tradable to nontradable goods in 
these more rapidly growing economies. Differences over shorter pe- 
riods, particularly during the early 1970s, are explainable in terms of 
lags in the operation of  U.S. reserve flows on monetary growth in the 
nonreserve countries. 
The dollar's status as the reserve currency of the international econ- 
omy seemed impregnable during these years. Commercial banks and 
private firms could make foreign payments in their convertible curren- 
cies without the approval of central banks. Tariff and quota restrictions 
on commodity trade among the industrialized  countries were eased, 
and foreign trade grew at a rapid rate during the period. International 
transfers of capital grew, with New York at the center of the flows and 
the dollar as the vehicle currency in  which the borrowers obtained 
capital and the investors lent their savings. 
The successful operation of the system depended on foreign central 
banks intervening with their own currencies against the dollar to main- 
tain par values and the United States standing ready to buy or sell gold 
at $35 per ounce in transactions with foreign monetary authorities. The 
U.S. balance of payments accordingly was determined by the exchange 
parities other countries established. In general, other countries desired 
surpluses that would add to their dollar reserves, and the system tended 
to produce a steadily weakening U.S. balance of payments and growing 
doubts  about  the  sustainability  of  the  U.S.  gold  convertibility 
commitment. 
14.2.1  Gold and the Dollar 
A portent of the troubled future of  the system was that 1960 was the 
first year in which U.S.  gold reserves declined below the level of its 340  Anna J. Schwartz 
total liquid liabilities to all foreign holders of assets denominated in 
dollars (table 14.3). 
Until March 1961, the U.S. intervened to maintain the price of gold 
by selling and buying dollars. Concern over the continuing conversion 
of dollars in gold led the Treasury to activate the Exchange Stabilization 
Fund. In its initial operations on 13 March 1961, acting through the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York as its agent, the Fund sold forward 
D-marks  to reduce the premium on that c~rrency.~  On 13 February 
1962 the bank was also authorized to buy or sell foreign currencies on 
behalf of the Federal Open Market Committee in both spot and forward 
markets. For this purpose a stock of foreign currencies in addition to 
those acquired from the Stabilization Fund was needed. The Federal 
Reserve therefore negotiated a network of swap facilities with the cen- 
tral banks of other countries. The swap provided a specified amount 
of foreign currency in exchange for an equivalent dollar credit for the 
foreign central bank, with each party  protected  against loss from a 
change in the par value of the other party’s currency. Invested balances 
of both parties earned the same rate of interest, foreign balances in 
special U.S. Treasury certificates, Federal Reserve balances in interest- 
earning deposits abroad. Balances were available for payments to the 
other party or  for foreign exchange market transactions. The swap was 
a credit line, usually for three-month periods, renewable at maturity. 
By drawing on the credit, both parties initially raised their gross re- 
serves. The Federal Reserve normally used the proceeds of a swap to 
absorb foreign official dollar holdings; these transactions in effect pro- 
vided forward cover to foreign official dollarholders, reducing their 
incentive to convert dollars into gold. 
Repayments of short-term swap credits meant a corresponding de- 
cline in gross reserves. For the U.S.  this could entail a loss of gold. 
To deter this eventuality, the U.S. began issuing nonmarketable bonds, 
with maturities of  fifteen months to two years, denominated in the 
holder’s  currency, to fund outstanding swap debt. The bonds were, 
however, convertible into Treasury bills on demand. lo 
A further indication of U.S. concern about gold was the prohibition 
after mid-1961 on the holding of gold outside the U.S. by U.S. firms 
and households, and on 3 March  1965 the abolition of gold reserve 
requirements against Federal Reserve deposits. 
A focus of pressure on the U.S. dollar was the London gold market. 
In March 1960, the price rose above $35 an ounce, as European central 
banks and private investors bought gold for dollars. The Bank of  En- 
gland sold gold to stabilize the price, but the U.S.  Treasury initially 
was not willing to restore the bank’s holdings. Hence, when a rise in 
the price of gold occurred in October, the bank did not intervene. On 
27 October, with the price reaching $40 an ounce, the Treasury agreed Table 14.3  United States Monetary Gold Stock and Liquid Liabilities 
to Foreigners (millions of dollars) 
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aThe stock includes gold sold to the U.S. by the IMF with the right of repurchase, and 
gold deposited by the IMF to mitigate the impact on the U.S. of foreign purchases for 
the purpose of making gold subscriptions to the IMF under quota increases. 
bThe  total includes small amounts due to the IMF arising from gold transactions, amounts 
due to official institutions, commercial banks abroad, to other foreigners, and to non- 
monetary and regional organizations. Nonliquid liabilities to official institutions included 
in the source beginning 1962 through 1973 have been deducted.  Years for which two 
entries are shown show differences because of changes in reporting coverage. Figures 342  Anna J. Schwartz 
Table 14.3  (continued) 
on  the first line are comparable to figures for preceding dates; figures on the second line 
are comparable to those for the following dates. 
CThe  figure excludes $259 million gold subscription to the IMF in June  1965 for a U.S. 
quota increase that became effective 23 February 1966. 
dChange  in par value of dollar on 8 May  1972 increased the value of the total gold stock 
by $822 million. 
Thange in par value of dollar on 18 October 1973 increased the value of the gold stock 
by $1,165 million. 
fIncludes categories of  liabilities previously classified as nonliquid. 
to sell gold to the bank, reserving for the bank the decision on inter- 
vention in the market.  European central banks  soon after agreed to 
refrain from buying gold in the London market for monetary purposes 
whenever the price rose above $35.20, the U.S.  price plus  shipping 
costs. When the price fell below that level in 1961, the central banks 
returned  to the market.  However,  in October  1961, when the price 
again was reacting to heightened  demand, an agreement to create a 
“gold  pool”  was reached among the U.S.  and seven European gov- 
ernments. Each member undertook to supply an agreed portion of net 
gold sales to stabilize the market, as the Bank of England as agent of 
the group  determined  to be  appropriate.  The members of  the pool 
subsequently agreed not to buy gold individually on the market, but 
to give the Bank of  England the right to buy  on their joint account 
when gold supply exceeded demand, the amount purchased to be dis- 
tributed in proportion to each country’s contribution to the pool. The 
pool functioned until the end of  1967, when a surge of buying led to 
the suspension of the agreement in March 1968. During the period of 
the pool’s operation, the participants sold a net of $2.5 billion of gold 
on the London market, of which $1.6 billion was provided by the United 
States. 
14.2.2  The Dollar’s Performance 
A key development for the international monetary system that was 
not perceived as  such at the time was the acceleration of the U.S. 
monetary  growth rate and the  subsequent  acceleration  of  the U.S. 
inflation rate in the final years of this subperiod. What was perceived 
was the cumulative growth of deficits in the U.S. balance of payments. 
Assets denominated in dollars grew in excess of the demand for them 
by the rest of the world. Their conversion into gold, by shrinking U.S. 
gold reserves, threatened one of the basic underpinnings of the Bretton 
Woods structure, namely, convertibility of dollars into gold. 
One measure the U.S. authorities might have taken was a raise in 
the dollar price of gold, thus increasing the value of the stock and the 
flow of reserve assets. If other countries did not follow suit by adopting 343  Evolution of the International Monetary System 
a proportional increase in the price of gold in their currencies, the U.S. 
in this way might have obtained a devaluation of the dollar that the 
Bretton Woods system otherwise ruled out. Had the price of gold risen, 
the gold demands of other countries might have been satisfied without 
the rundown in U.S.  reserve assets. Some countries might also have 
revalued because of the inflationary consequences of their payments 
surplus, given the gold-based increase in their asset holdings. 
The U.S.,  however, resolutely  opposed a change in the monetary 
price of gold. Such action would have required  an Act of Congress 
which would have produced a long and unsettling debate in the two 
Houses, during which time the foreign exchange markets would have 
been disturbed. Moreover, there was no assurance that other countries 
would not make corresponding changes in their own par values, and 
it was feared that confidence in the stability of the monetary system 
would be seriously impaired by a change in the official dollar price of 
gold. Given the fixed price of gold when national price levels were 
rising, gold became an undervalued asset with a resulting gold shortage. 
The Bretton Woods system might have been able to survive an end 
of gold convertibility. It could not survive inflationary monetary policy 
in the center country that characterized the decade from the mid- 1960s 
on. Crisis management by the IMF and the central banks of the leading 
industrialized countries became the hallmark of the international mon- 
etary system during the heyday of Bretton Woods.I*  The chief currency 
under pressure, apart from the dollar, was sterling. Persistent or re- 
curring U.K.  balance-of-payments deficits impaired the credibility of 
sterling’s external  value,  already insecure by  reason  of  the size of 
sterling balances held  worldwide  relative  to U.K.  gold and foreign 
exchange reserves. Private agents displayed lack of confidence in the 
dollar and sterling by shifting to currencies whose external values were 
regarded as stable or  likely to  appreciate (during this period, the D-mark 
and guilder). Repeated rescue operations to support the exchange value 
of sterling were overwhelmed in November  1967. Sterling, however, 
was a sideshow. The main act was the dollar’s performance. 
A variety of  measures, adopted in countries with over- or under- 
valued currencies to stave off devaluation or revaluation, affected the 
channels of international transmission of price change.  Surplus coun- 
tries tried to avoid price increases, deficit countries price declines, both 
as external consequences of their balance-of-payments positions.  In- 
termittently, depending on cyclical conditions, countries in both cat- 
egories took steps to right payments imbalances. 
14.2.3  Growth of World Foreign Reserves 
Since palliatives to improve the balance of payments proved inef- 
fective, deficits had to be financed either by drawing down reserves or 
seeking external  credit  or borrowing  facilities,  while  surpluses  ob- 344  Anna J. Schwartz 
viously increased net reserve accumulations. During the heyday of the 
Bretton Woods system, despite the growth of dollar assets, the ade- 
quacy of international liquidity, in the sense of  the quantity of  inter- 
national monetary reserves, was widely debated. Discussions during 
this period growing out of misplaced concern for the supply of reserves 
ultimately led to the creation of SDRs by the IMF, but that development 
belongs in the account of the breakdown of the system.I3 Until the end 
of 1967, international reserves were limited to gold, convertible foreign 
exchange, and reserve positions in the IMF. 
Contrary  to the design of  Bretton Woods, financing of  payments 
imbalances for the most part was arranged through credits governments 
extended on a bilateral basis and through international borrowing and 
lending activities of commercial banks. Thus, to restore depleted re- 
serves of countries with persistent deficits, facilities for borrowing were 
created in addition to drawings from the IMF. 
Official dollar reserves of the surplus countries were augmented at 
times by actions those countries took in the Eurodollar market. Dollars 
acquired by their central banks and deposited in the Eurodollar market 
either directly or through the Bank for International Settlements would 
usually be re-lent to private borrowers who could resell the dollars to 
the central banks. 
With the exception of the U.K. and the U.S.,  all the countries in 
our sample increased their holdings of  international reserves. In sum, 
world reserves grew during the period,  leaving greater scope for the 
direct monetary channel of transmission of inflation to operate (table 
14.4). 
14.3  Weakening and Collapse of Bretton Woods, 1968-73 
The devaluation of sterling in November  1967 was not regarded as 
the prelude to changes in the par values of other currencies, the de- 
valuation of the dollar in terms of gold, the realignment of exchange- 
rate relations among the major currencies, and the substitution of  a 
short-lived regime of  central rates for the par value  system-all  of 
which took place between November 1967 and December 1971. Instead, 
it was hoped that balance in the U.S. and U.K. external payments was 
finally on the point of achievement, and that the creation of a special 
drawing rights facility in the IMF would replace reserve assets that 
dollar and sterling deficits had provided. 
The hope was belied. The pattern of deficits and surpluses persisted 
and worsened  in  1970 and  1971. The U.S.  current  account surplus 
dwindled, and the U.S. capital account deficit grew dramatically, pro- 
ducing current account surpluses and capital inflows in other countries. 
The activation of SDRs in 1970-72 provided additions to already mas- 
sive acquisitions of dollar reserve assets.I4 Table 14.4  Average Quarterly Change at Annual  Rates and Variance in the Level of International 
Reserves (miuionS of U.S. dollars) 
CA  FR  GE  IT  JA  NE  UK  us 
1953-58IV  8 
(9) 
1958IV-67IV  40 
(325) 
1967IV-731  477 
(  1,026) 
19731-761V  -  248 
(638) 
~~~ 





(1  1,638) 
-  563 
(20,341) 
~~ 
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As in the heyday of the Bretton Woods system, disbelief of  market 
participants in the pegged external values of currencies precipitated 
eruptions of turbulence in foreign exchange and gold markets, but the 
heart of the problem affecting the international monetary system was 
the performance of the dollar. The failure of the U.S. to maintain price 
stability led to institutional change in 1968, repegging in 1971, and finally 
the total collapse of fixed exchange-rate parities in 1973. 
14.3.1  Foreign Exchange Turbulence 
In May 1968, student riots in France touched off strikes and lockouts 
throughout the country.  The settlement raised hourly wage rates by 
11%, shortened the work week, and provoked a flight of capital, pri- 
marily into D-marks but also into gold. Rumors of a revaluation of the 
mark encouraged further shifts of funds. France imposed tighter price 
controls, restricted imports and some external payments, introduced 
subsidies for exports, and imposed exchange controls. These measures 
were revoked in September, and credit restrictions substituted. In No- 
vember, the flight from francs to marks intensified, and on 20 Novem- 
ber, major European exchange markets were shut down. Between April 
and November 1968, official French foreign exchange reserves declined 
by $2.9 billion. France resisted advice to devalue, Germany advice to 
revalue. Germany imposed a temporary export tax and an import sub- 
sidy, and in December a  100%  reserve requirement on increases in 
nonresident deposits in German banks, but almost immediately relaxed 
the measure as funds flowed out. France in turn restored exchange and 
credit controls, the former having only been fully relaxed a year earlier, 
cut public spending and increased indirect taxes, and imposed ceilings 
on commercial bank lending and raised interest rates. 
The deficit in the French current account grew in the first two quar- 
ters of 1969, and capital that flowed to Germany not only from France 
but also from the U.K. and other countries totaled $4.4 billion in May. 
Again, Germany adopted measures to deter the inflow: a 50% reserve 
requirement for nonresident deposits received before 15 April and 15% 
on resident deposits. The French tightened restrictions on bank credit 
and raised minimum requirements for hire purchase. In July funds for 
public investment programs were frozen. When the drain on French 
reserves continued and short-term debts of $2.3 billion had been in- 
curred, France finally gave in and devalued by 11.1  1%  as of 10 August. 
Currencies linked to the French franc followed suit. 
Thanks to increased monetary growth in the U.S. and the resultant 
higher balance-of-payments  deficit, France rapidly moved from $1.7 
billion deficit on current account in 1969 to a small surplus in 1970, an 
overall balance-of-payments  surplus of  $2 billion in that year and of 
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The perception that the D-mark was undervalued in relation to the 
dollar, now that the French franc had been devalued, led to a further 
flow of  funds to Germany. A few days before  German elections in 
October 1969, the Bundesbank closed the exchange market, and a day 
after reopening it, permitted the D-mark to float. The spot rate against 
the dollar appreciated, and on 26 October, a revaluation of 9.29% was 
announced. Although there was a capital outflow in the last quarter of 
1969, by  1970 there were large inflows of  foreign funds and official 
reserves increased substantially. Domestic inflation in Germany was 
thereby eventually worsened. 
The persistent outflow of funds from the U.S. overwhelmed foreign 
exchange markets in the first few days of May 1971. On 5 May seven 
European countries closed their foreign exchange markets, and five 
other countries on several continents withdrew their support for the 
dollar and suspended dealings in D-marks, guilders, and Swiss francs. 
On 9 May, both Germany and the Netherlands announced that their 
currencies would float, since they could not maintain exchange rates 
within the established margins. 
14.3.2  Gold and the Dollar 
The gold market was the second market in which participants ex- 
pressed lack of confidence in the dollar-based international monetary 
system. After the devaluation of sterling in November 1967, the vul- 
nerability of  the dollar took center stage. In the winter of 1967-68,  a 
surge of demand for gold threatened both the London Gold Pool and 
the statutory backing for Federal Reserve notes that then amounted to 
$10 billion. On 12 March 1968 the U.S. gold reserve requirement was 
abolished. Ostensibly, the gold stock was then available for conversion 
of dollars held by foreign central banks. On 17  March, however, the 
London gold market was closed to avoid further U.S. gold losses. The 
members of the gold pool announced that they would no longer supply 
gold to the London or any other gold market or buy gold from the 
market. Official transactions between central banks were to be con- 
ducted at the unchanged official price of  $35 an ounce, but the gold 
price for private transactions  was  to be  determined in  the market. 
Central banks were still free de jure to buy U.S.  Treasury gold for 
dollars but in fact refrained from doing so. Germany  had  explicitly 
forsworn converting its dollar holdings into gold in May 1967. 
In March  1971, before the panic of  the foreign exchange market, 
there was a request from several European countries for conversion 
of officially held dollars into gold to enable them to pay for an increase 
in their IMF quotas. The payout reduced the U.S.  gold stock to the 
lowest level  since  1936. The dollar outflow meanwhile accelerated, 
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uation of the dollar vis-a-vis the D-mark as the result of the float left 
unsolved the dollar’s exchange rate vis-a-vis the yen. Japan’s capital 
controls were proof against the dollar flows that inundated European 
foreign exchange markets, but not against the large deficit in U.S. trade 
with Japan. That bilateral trade imbalance was a provocation, over and 
above the imbalance between  U.S.  reserves  and outstanding dollar 
liabilities, for the changes the U.S.  introduced on 15 August 1971 to 
achieve a dollar devaluation. Chief among them (besides a price and 
wage freeze, tax increases, and federal government spending cuts) was 
a 10% import surcharge on 50% of total U.S. imports. The converti- 
bility of the dollar into gold was formally suspended, as was the use 
of the swap network through which dollars could be exchanged with 
central banks for other currencies. The effect was to oblige other coun- 
tries to hold dollars or to trade them for a price determined in the 
market and so to revalue their currencies. Foreign exchange markets 
abroad, except in Japan, shut down. The Japanese initial attempt to 
maintain the pegged rate of the yen compelled them to purchase $4 
billion in the two weeks after  15 August. The yen was then freed to 
float upward; other currencies floated when exchange markets were 
reopened on 23 August. France introduced a dual exchange market, 
with trade and government exchange dealings based on the par value, 
financial exchange dealings at a floating rate. Restoration of a repegged 
system of exchange rates, however, remained the goal of the U.S. and 
its partners. 
After much negotiation, a readjustment of currency parities was ar- 
ranged at a meeting at the Smithsonian Institution in Washington on 
17-18 December 1971. In return the US.  agreed to  withdraw the import 
surcharge. The currencies of six of the countries in our sample (plus 
those of nonsample ones) were revalued by percentages ranging from 
2y4%  (the Netherlands) to 7.7% (Japan) with the proviso that  21/4% 
margins of  fluctuation (replacing the former  1%  margin) above and 
below the so-called central exchange rates were permissible. The Ca- 
nadian dollar continued to float. The Smithsonian agreement also spec- 
ified that the official dollar price of  gold would henceforth be $38, a 
concession by  the  U.S.  for appearance’ sake only, since the dollar 
remained inconvertible. The new price of gold implied a depreciation 
of  7.9% of the gold value of the dollar rather than an appreciation of 
the dollar value of other currencies. 
14.3.3  European Economic Community Snake 
The notion of a European monetary union had been the subject of 
discussion for years. Implementing the notion had been scheduled for 
a start in June 1971. The floating of the D-mark in May delayed the 
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currencies within narrower limits than those vis-B-vis the dollar. The 
activation of the snake came in April  1972  in response to the 21/4% 
margin above and below the central rate that the Smithsonian agree- 
ment set. In relation to the dollar a European currency could fluctuate 
by 41/2%  from floor to ceiling,  but  in  relation to another European 
currency the relative fluctuation could be as much as 9%  if  one rose 
from floor to ceiling and the other fell from ceiling to floor. The mo- 
tivation for the snake was to narrow margins of fluctuation between 
EEC currencies by a convergence of economic and monetary policies 
so that exchange parities among them would be fixed. 
Operationally, if an EEC currency premium over its central rate plus 
the discount on the central rate of another EEC currency reached 21/4% 
(half the amount permitted by the Smithsonian agreement), the weak 
currency was to be bought by the strong currency. The purchase could 
be made by the weak-currency country, by the strong-currency country, 
or by both. A monthly settlement was provided, so the creditor country 
could exchange the weak currency acquired for a desired reserve asset 
and obtain repayment for its short-term credit facility if it had lent its 
currency to the debtor. Debtors were to make settlement in a prescribed 
mix of reserve assets. 
Six countries (France, Germany, Italy,  Belgium, Luxemburg, the 
Netherlands)  originally joined the snake; three others joined in May 
1972  but  left in June (U.K.,  Denmark, Eire).  Denmark rejoined  in 
October 1972, Italy left in December 1972. France left in January 1974, 
rejoined  in  July  1975,  and left  again  in  March  1976.  Sweden  and 
Norway,  non-EEC  countries, joined  in  May  1972.  Sweden  left  in 
August  1977. 
The feasibility of the snake was dubious in the absence of consensus 
by  the national governments  to yield  to the union  direct  monetary 
autonomy and control over exchange-rate changes, and to seek con- 
vergence of economic policies. 
14.3.4  The End of the Sterling Area 
Within weeks after joining the snake, sterling came under pressure 
in foreign exchange markets. The central banks of the EEC countries 
supported sterling, but on the next settlement day the U.K. would have 
had to repay them. On 22 June 1972 the bank rate was raised by 1%, 
and on the following day the exchange rate was  floated.  The float 
marked the end of the sterling area. Capital flows to overseas sterling 
areas were made subject to the same exchange controls as other areas, 
and Bank of  England  approval was required for official foreign ex- 
change for direct investment in the overseas sterling area. Only a few 
small countries of the sixty-five that had formerly pegged their curren- 
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14.3.5  The End of the Convertible Dollar Standard 
The central rates established at the Smithsonian meeting crumbled 
during the nine months following the floating of sterling. Once again, 
the disbelief of market participants in those rates was revealed in the 
gold and foreign exchange markets. The London free market price of 
gold rose with few reversals. Money growth and inflation rates contin- 
ued to rise in the U.S.,  and both the balance of trade and the U.S. 
balance-of-payments deficit soared, with a corresponding surge in dol- 
lar holdings of the industrialized European countries and Japan. Capital 
controls were imposed in  1972 by the Netherlands and Japan before 
sterling was floated, and Germany followed suit afterward. On 10 Feb- 
ruary  1973 Japan closed its foreign exchange market and suspended 
support of the dollar. New central values were set in a hurried round 
of negotiations, although the lira, yen, Canadian dollar, U.K. and Irish 
pounds, and Swiss franc all floated. Again, the official price of gold 
was raised (this time to $42.22), leaving unchanged the gold value of 
other currencies. The new central rates did not staunch the flow of 
dollars abroad, and a further crisis erupted in March 1973. This time 
the major industrial countries discontinued pegging their exchange rates 
to the dollar. The EEC countries in the snake plus Sweden and Norway 
agreed to a joint float, with Germany revaluing by  3% (in terms of 
SDRs) in relation to the other members. Canada, Japan, and Switzer- 
land floated individually, as did a handful of other countries. Though 
a large group of nonindustrialized countries pegged to the dollar, the 
dollar currency area worldwide contracted; smaller groups of countries 
pegged to the French franc or to the pound. 
Market forces had triumphed. 
14.4  Managed Floating Exchange Rates 
When pegged rates were abandoned in March 1973, it was initially 
assumed that floating was a temporary expedient to be succeeded by 
a reformed par value system. The U.S. took the lead in opposing the 
return to such a system. The dispersion of  inflation rates among the 
industrialized countries and the higher variability of rates of inflation 
since the late 1960s enforced more frequent changes of exchange rates. 
Under the earlier system, changes in par values were delayed until 
foreign exchange market crises were provoked. The lesson since the 
shift in March  1973 was that floating provided  more flexibility. The 
U.S. view prevailed. With the suspension of official gold convertibility, 
and widespread departures from the IMF’s par value provisions, ne- 
gotiations were held to codify, in the form of amendments to the IMF 
Articles, the international monetary arrangements that had evolved in 
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Under the amendments to the IMF Articles agreed on in early 1976 
and implemented in April 1978, gold was formally removed from its 
previous central role in the IMF and IMF par value obligations were 
eliminated.  The official IMF gold price was abolished, as were also 
gold convertibility and maintenance of gold value obligations.  Gold 
was eliminated as a significant instrument in IMF transactions with 
members, and the IMF was empowered to dispose of its large gold 
holdings. Although the amended IMF Articles provide for the future 
possibility of establishing a system of stable but adjustable par values, 
such a decision by the Fund would require an 85% affirmative vote by 
the members, thus giving the United  States an effective veto.  The 
provisions in the amended IMF Articles relating to the establishment 
of par values specify that the common denominator of the system shall 
not be gold or a currency. 
It is useful to examine the manner in which various aspects of the 
international monetary system have been affected by the shift from the 
pegged to the managed floating exchange-rate system. These aspects 
include (a)  the role of reserve assets and of dollar assets; (6) the role 
of gold; (c)  the role of central bank intervention in foreign exchange 
markets; (6)  the variability of exchange rates; (e) the role of monetary 
policy. 
14.4.1 
It was widely believed that the stock of reserve assets would contract 
in a world of floating exchange rates compared to a world of pegged 
rates.  In fact, (nominal) official holdings of  reserve assets have  in- 
creased  every year since the float.  From  1950 to 1969, on average, 
world reserves including gold rose by less than 3%  per year, the foreign 
exchange component by 5% per year. From the end of 1969 to the end 
of 1972, the average annual rate of increase of foreign currency reserves 
was 43%.  Since 1973, the average annual rate of increase has been 
15%.  The main source of growth of foreign currency reserves since 
1973, as in earlier years, has been in the form of dollars.I6 The demand 
for reserves has increased even under floating rates because the system 
is substantially managed.” 
A significant change in the distribution of foreign exchange reserves 
has occurred since October 1973 as a result of the rise in the price of 
oil. Total foreign exchange reserves of industrial oil-importing countries 
have increased at a slightly slower pace than reserves of all countries, 
which sextupled since 1970, but the major oil-exporting countries, which 
in 1970 held only about 8% of total world foreign exchange reserves, 
by  the end of  the decade held  about one-quarter of the total.  The 
motivations of oil-exporting countries for holding foreign-currency de- 
nominated assets are, however, clearly quite different from those of 
industrial countries. 
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Although other currencies have increased their role as reserve cur- 
rencies in recent years, the dollar has continued to serve as the main 
reserve currency, accounting for about 80% of the world’s official for- 
eign exchange reserves. To the extent of intervention, as under pegged 
rates, the U.S.  has settled its payments deficits in dollars, which for- 
eigners willingly add to their asset holdings and use in payments to 
other countries. The dollar also remains the main official intervention 
currency in foreign exchange markets and serves as a common vehicle 
currency in the interbank market for foreign exchange. In effect, the 
world has adopted an inconvertible dollar standard. 
One change in the international reserve profile was the creation on 
13  March  1979 of  the  European  Monetary  System-replacing  the 
“smaller”  size European joint float-by  nine European countries (Bel- 
gium, Denmark, France, Germany, Eire, Italy, Luxembourg, and the 
Netherlands; the U.K. is a member but does not participate in inter- 
vention arrangements). The center of the system is the European Cur- 
rency Unit (a basket of all nine currencies), issued by the European 
Monetary Cooperation Fund in an amount equal to a deposit of 20% 
of gold and dollar reserves of participating countries, to be used for 
settlement of intervention debts (see below). ECUs now included in 
foreign exchange holdings of  the participating countries,  except for 
revaluation changes, do not increase world monetary reserves.’* 
With gold valued at market price, gold reserves at the end of  1979 
were larger than foreign exchange reserves. The U.S., however, values 
its own gold assets at the official price of $42.22 per ounce, despite the 
abolition of an official IMF price for gold. 
If a high rate of growth of world foreign exchange reserves provides 
evidence of an international transmission process at work, it is apparent 
that no change in behavior in the aggregate has occurred in that regard 
since 1973. 
14.4.2  The Role of Gold 
After the float, the U.S.  took the position that gold should be de- 
monetized. An opposing view was promoted  principally by  France. 
Developments reflect the extent to which one or the other dominated 
international decisions. At issue was the use of gold in official trans- 
actions at the free market price, and the substitution of gold for the 
dollar in inter-central  bank  settlements at a fixed but higher official 
price. 
The prescription against official transactions in the gold market that 
had been adopted in March 1968 was terminated in November 1973, 
but the official price of  $42.22  posted  in  February  1973 was  so far 
below the private market price that central banks were unwilling to 
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banks were equally reluctant to sell gold on the private market in view 
of the possible depressive effect of sales on the market price or in 
anticipation of the opportunity to sell in the future at a higher price. 
In December 1973 the IMF terminated arrangements made four years 
earlier, under which it had been prepared to purchase gold from South 
Africa. 
In June  1974 countries in  the Group of Ten (the U.S.,  the U.K., 
Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Canada, the Netherlands, Belgium, and 
Sweden) agreed that gold could be used as collateral for intercentral 
bank loans at a price other than the official gold price, and in September 
Italy obtained a loan from Germany on the pledge of Italian gold valued 
at a mutually agreed price. In December the U.S.  and France agreed 
that central banks were at liberty in valuing gold holdings for balance 
sheet purposes to use the market price, which the Bank  of  France 
proceeded to do. 
Early in  1975  the countries in the Group of Ten and Switzerland 
agreed for a two-year period not to increase the sum of their and the 
IMF’s gold holdings and to contribute no support to the price of gold 
in the free market. In August 1975 agreement was reached by an IMF 
committee that19 
the official price of gold would be abolished; 
members would not be obliged to use gold in transactions with the 
Fund; 
a part of the Fund’s gold holdings would be sold at auction for the 
benefit of developing countries, and another part would be re- 
turned to member countries in proportion to their quotas. 
The first public auction of part of the Fund’s gold holdings was held 
in June  1976. A four-year sales program was scheduled. In the first 
two years, sixteen auctions were held approximately every six weeks, 
with aggregate sales of 12.5 million ounces. The balance of  12.5 million 
ounces was sold mainly in twenty-four auction lots through May 1980, 
and a small amount in noncompetitive sales. Restitution of 25 million 
ounces to member countries over a four-year period was completed in 
December 1979/January 1980. 
The U.S. repealed the prohibition against gold holding by U.S. res- 
idents as of 31 December 1974 and empowered the Treasury to offset 
any increase in market price as a result of this increment to private 
demand by offering gold at auction. The first auctions were held in 
January and June 1975, when the Treasury disposed of 13 million ounces. 
No auctions were held in 1976 and 1977. They were resumed in  1978 
and  1979, when the Treasury sold 4.0 and  11.8 million ounces, re- 
spectively, motivated both by the desire to reduce the U.S. balance- 
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gold nor any other commodity provides a suitable base for monetary 
arrangements.”20 Since 1979 the Treasury has sold no gold bullion.21 
Members no longer define the exchange value of their currency in 
terms of gold and trade in and account for gold at any price consistent 
with their domestic laws. Gold is no longer the nume‘raire of the in- 
ternational monetary system. The introduction of SDRs (valued in terms 
of a basket of national currencies, as of July 1974, rather than in terms 
of gold) was intended to replace both the dollar and gold in the inter- 
national monetary system. 
The market price of gold has increased more rapidly since the float 
than the prices of most other durable assets.22  The future role of gold 
in the international monetary system as a reserve asset and as a de- 
terminant of the world’s price level may depend on the performance 
of the dollar. If the performance of the dollar improves, gold may be 
dethroned even if  its use as a reserve asset continues. Failure of the 
dollar  to perform  in  a  stable fashion  in  the future leaves  open the 
possibility of a restoration of a significant role for gold. 
14.4.3  Role of  Central Bank Intervention 
Direct official intervention to maintain the open market price of cur- 
rencies within narrow limits has not lessened under floating rates com- 
pared with the pegged parity system. Intervention in some countries 
is assigned to nationalized industries that borrow foreign currency in 
order to buy their own currency on the foreign exchange market, in 
Italy  and the U.K.  with government provision  of  insurance against 
foreign exchange loss, in France with no such provision. In Japan and 
sometimes in France, dollar deposits held by the government at com- 
mercial banks are used for intervention. Italian and French commercial 
banks intervene at the government’s behest. Central bank intervention 
may thus be conducted by a variety of institutions at the direction of 
the monetary authorities. 
The pattern of intervention since the float by the U.S. and its trading 
partners is to buy dollars both when the dollar depreciates relative to 
a particular foreign currency and when one foreign currency appreci- 
ates relative to another. Countries with weak currencies sell dollars. 
When the  supply of  dollars  increases in foreign exchange markets, 
managed floaters may buy up some of the additional dollars or may 
permit  the price of  dollars  to fall in terms of their own currencies. 
Buying up dollars has negative consequences for domestic monetary 
control; permitting the price of dollars to rise can have negative con- 
sequences for oil-importing countries. 
There was apparently little intervention during the four months fol- 
lowing the float in February 1973. The progressive decline in the weighted 
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a group of major currencies led to a decision by the governors of the 
central banks of the Group of Ten to support the dollar. In July 1973 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York began to intervene in the New 
York spot exchange market to avoid “disorderly market conditions.” 
Intervention was effected with the Federal Reserve’s own small hold- 
ings of foreign currency or by activating the much larger total of foreign 
currency loans through swap agreements. 
Concerted exchange intervention was agreed to by the Federal Re- 
serve, the Bundesbank, and the Swiss National Bank in  May  1974, 
after several months of dollar depreciation. The dollar strengthened 
until September, when renewed  weakness developed through March 
1975. The explanation given by the Board of Governors was:23 
Contributing to this decline in the dollar’s exchange value was the 
asymmetry in intervention policies between countries with weaker 
currencies and those with strengthening currencies. Intervention sales 
of dollars by countries supporting weaker currencies exceeded pur- 
chases of dollars by countries resisting the appreciation of their cur- 
rencies. The net effect of these operations was to add to the market 
supply of dollars, depressing the dollar’s average exchange rate. 
Explicit approval of management of floating exchange rates was ex- 
pressed by the IMF  in six guidelines it issued in June 1974.24  Acceptance 
of intervention as desirable policy was reiterated in a November 1975 
meeting that preceded the revision of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement 
in  1976. 
The dollar showed little weakness in  1976, and the Federal Reserve 
intervened to sell dollars on behalf of other currencies. In January the 
Italian lira came under pressure.  The decline in its exchange value 
weakened the French franc within the European currency snake, lead- 
ing to substantial French intervention. Massive intervention to support 
sterling, which declined from $2.00 in March to $1.77 in mid-September, 
was provided by a $5.3 billion stand-by credit arranged by the Group 
of Ten countries, Switzerland, and the Bank for International Settle- 
ments. Sterling’s further decline later in the year led to an IMF  drawing, 
further borrowing, and a facility to reduce official sterling balances. 
Interventions were also engaged in to moderate appreciations of the 
D-mark, the Swiss franc, and the yen. 
Renewed weakness of  the dollar in early 1977 was masked by large 
intervention purchases of dollars by the Bank of England and the Bank 
of Italy undertaken to limit the appreciation of their currencies and to 
rebuild their reserve positions. The Federal Reserve intervened only 
occasionally during the first three quarters. When the Bank of England 
ended its large purchases of dollars, the dollar dropped sharply. The 
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was joined by the U.S. Treasury Exchange Stabilization Fund, which 
negotiated a new swap facility with the Bundesbank. 
The decline in the weighted average exchange value of the dollar 
accelerated  in  1978 through  the  end  of  October.25  An  anti-inflation 
program announced on 24 October (contractionary fiscal and monetary 
policy, voluntary wage and price standards, and a reduction in the cost 
of  regulatory  actions)  had  no  effect  on the  exchange  market.  On 
1 November, the administration and the Federal Reserve took further 
action. A $30 billion intervention package was arranged with Germany, 
Japan, and Switzerland. The Federal Reserve raised the discount rate 
from 81/2%  to 91/2% and imposed a 2% supplementary reserve require- 
ment on large time deposits. During the last two months of 1978, U.S. 
support operations for the dollar totaled $6.7 billion, including sales of 
Treasury securities denominated in foreign currencies and significant 
purchases of dollars by  Germany, Japan, and Switzerland. By  June 
1979 the dollar’s value (measured on a trade-weighted basis) had risen 
from its 1978 low by about lo%, and U.S. authorities had repurchased 
a greater sum of foreign currency than had been sold in the last two 
months of 1978. The dollar then began to weaken, and U.S. intervention 
sales of  foreign  currencies,  chiefly  D-marks, resumed.  Gross sales 
amounted to $91/2  billion equivalent between mid-June and early Oc- 
tober. In addition, the Federal Reserve raised the discount rate to 11% 
in September. 
On 6 October 1979 the Federal Reserve announced a wide-ranging 
set of measures to tighten monetary control (a shift in operating pro- 
cedures to place less emphasis upon control of the Federal Funds rate 
and more emphasis upon control of bank reserves; an increase in the 
discount rate to 12%; a marginal reserve requirement on banks’ man- 
aged liabilities), and the dollar began to appreciate. After April 1980, 
however, the dollar began to decline, a movement that was reversed 
in September. From October 1979 on, the U.S. intervened frequently, 
operating on both sides of the market. When the dollar was in demand, 
it acquired foreign currencies in the market and from correspondents 
to repay earlier debt and to build up balances.  The Federal Reserve 
was a buyer from February to March. From late March to early April 
and beyond, it sold D-marks, Swiss francs, and French francs. By the 
end of  July, the U.S.  was  again accumulating currencies.  Both  the 
Treasury and the Federal Reserve Trading Desk made net purchases 
of D-marks and lesser amounts of Swiss francs and French francs on 
days when the dollar was strong, selling on days when the dollar weak- 
ened.  By  the end  of  1980, the  U.S.  was  intervening  in  the foreign 
exchange markets virtually on a day-to-day basis. For 1980 as a whole, 
U.S. authorities were net buyers of foreign currencies in an amount of 
$8.7 billion equivalent. 357  Evolution of the International Monetary System 
The Reagan administration soon after taking office announced  its 
intention to reduce the scale of intervention, to discontinue the policy 
of building up currency reserves, and to cut back its short-term swap 
arrangements with foreign countries. The reason for the shift in policy 
is the administration’s view that intervention is both costly and inef- 
fectual and that the way to restore exchange-rate stability is by the 
creation of more stable domestic economic conditions. Many foreign 
central banks do not share the Reagan administration’s views and con- 
tinue to intervene to affect the exchange value of their currencies. This 
raises a question whether the degree of control  U.S. authorities can 
exercise over the effective exchange rate for the dollar under a floating 
rate system is any greater than under a pegged exchange-rate system. 
The rationale for central bank intervention under floating rates is 
that the market does not move exchange rates smoothly to equilibrium 
levels, produces  “disorderly  conditions,”  and sets rates at variance 
with underlying economic conditions. It is assumed that central banks 
can determine better than markets the correct level of exchange rates 
and the proper degree of variability. A policy of leaning against the 
wind is justified by advocates of intervention as slowing the movement 
of exchange rates in either direction. 
To stabilize foreign exchange markets central banks should buy their 
currencies when prices are low to drive them up and sell their currencies 
when prices are high to drive them down. Such operations should net 
the central banks a profit. Buying at high but falling prices and selling 
at low but rising prices are defended as needed to achieve “orderly” 
markets. By resisting a gradual movement in exchange rates, central 
banks lose reserves and money until they abandon the support oper- 
ation, with a resulting sudden large movement in exchange rates. 
If the purpose of intervention were to reduce deviations of the market 
exchange rate from the equilibrium exchange rate, central bank op- 
erations would net profits but might not reduce the variance of  exchange- 
rate movements. If the equilibrium exchange rate shifts as a result of 
an economic shock, leaning against the wind may lower the variance 
of the exchange rate but will increase the size of the deviation of the 
exchange rate from its equilibrium level. In addition, the central bank 
will lose money on the operation. If there is no intervention, the vari- 
ance will  be larger,  the  central bank  will  not  lose money,  and the 
exchange rate will reflect the new equilibrium value sooner, thus al- 
lowing the rate to transmit undistorted information. 
The central banks as a group have not been conducting a profitable 
exercise by intervening in foreign exchange markets. An estimate for 
nine  countries  puts the loss for central bank  intervention  since the 
beginning of  the float at $10 to $12 billion, far in  excess of losses 
sustained by nationalized industries although for selected time periods 358  Anna J. Schwartz 
a country may record a profit.26 The evidence is that central banks 
have been suffering from an anachronistic behavior, resisting exchange- 
rate changes under nominally floating rates much as they  did under 
pegged rates. Central banks have no way of knowing when there is a 
change in the fundamental equilibrium level of exchange rates.27 By 
assuming the absence of a change in the equilibrium exchange rate and 
intervening to hold the exchange rate, they lose substantial amounts 
of money and ultimately have no choice but to permit the exchange 
rate to move. 
14.4.4  Variability of Exchange Rates 
One major change since the float has been the increased variability 
of exchange rates of the major industrial countries (table 14.5). Critics 
of  the floating regime argue that the variability has been excessive. 
Much of the movement, it is said, is unrelated to underlying economic 
and financial conditions which are not themselves likely to undergo 
rapid changes. Injury to international trade through exchange-rate fluc- 
tuation is claimed. The exchange rate is regarded as contributing to 
inflation, strong currencies not experiencing a reduction in exports as 
a result of appreciation, and weak currencies not experiencing a re- 
duction in imports as a result of depreciation. The widening of bid-ask 
spreads or increase of  transactions costs and the failure of  forward 
rates to predict future spot prices as well in the 1970s as in the 1960s 
are offered as evidence that speculators destabilize foreign exchange 
markets. The impact of  floating rates is said to increase uncertainty. 
The negative assessment of the behavior of exchange rates since the 
float omits a crucial factor: the market’s expectations with respect to 
inflation rates, monetary and fiscal policy, and general economic con- 
ditions.  Unstable domestic policies contribute to unstable exchange 
rates.28 Exchange-rate changes are dominated  by  speculation about 
these underlying economic factors.  If, despite appreciation,  strong- 
currency countries experience growth in exports and, despite depre- 
ciation, weak-currency countries experience growth  in  imports, the 
explanation is that costs of production in the former remain favorable 
if  policies in the latter permit inflationary expansion of demand, wage 
hikes, and increase in strike activity. It is uncertainty about domestic 
policies that produces higher transactions costs in foreign exchange 
markets. With respect to the failure of forward rates to predict future 
spot rates, the predictions have not been biased. Despite the volatility 
of exchange rates, no major disruptions to trade and capital flows have 
occurred since the float. In fact, floating exchange rates permitted the 
elimination of some capital controls. Capital controls introduced since 
the float are associated with the snake, where rates of exchange among 
the bloc were relatively fixed and moved in relation to one another Table 14.5  Average Quarterly Change at Annual Rates and the Variance 
of the Exchange Rate 
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only within relatively narrow bands.29  The balance-of-payments motive 
for tariffs is also defused by floating rates. If protectionism is perceived 
as on the rise since the float, it is related to stagflation rather than 
exchange-rate developments. 
A final point with respect to exchange rates relates to experience 
within the European Monetary System. The initial year after the ac- 
tivation of the exchange-rate mechanism of the European Monetary 
System in  1979 reduced  the range of  movements of  the participant 
currencies against the D-mark compared to the range in the preceding 
year. Nevertheless, two realignments of exchange rates were required 
as a result of divergencies in economic performance and in inflation 
experience (Germany,  September 1979; Denmark, November  1979). 
Large-scale interventions were undertaken to preserve the former ex- 
change rates but to no avail. The continued existence of large inflation 
differentials among the countries in the EMS suggests the fragility of 
the arrangement  is not less than it  was for the predecessor  snake. 
Countries that inflate at a faster rate than their trading partners cannot 
avoid depreciation of their currencies. As markets have become more 
insistent on allowing for expected future price movements in setting 
nominal interest rates, wider swings in interest-rate differentials among 
countries are also likely to contribute to exchange-rate instability. 
14.4.5  Role of Monetary Policy 
The Bretton Woods system broke  down essentially because non- 
reserve-currency countries were unwilling as a group to adopt the pol- 
icy of inflationary monetary growth the reserve-currency country was 
pursuing. To achieve independent monetary policy, the only workable 
exchange-rate system was floating. It was hoped that flexible exchange 
rates would permit a country to choose its desired long-run trend rate 
of monetary growth and of inflation, independent of other countries’ 
choices. 
Even when autonomy exists, monetary policy may perform badly. 
It is in this context that the movement in a number of countries during 
the 1970s  toward the improvement of monetary control must be viewed. 
Central banks have typically used short-term interest rates as the 
instruments to control monetary growth. Under noninflationary con- 
ditions, this conduct produced a procyclical movement in monetary 
growth. Under the gathering inflationary conditions since the mid-lWs, 
the inflation premium that became embedded in interest rates made the 
instrument unreliable as an indicator of restriction or ease. Reliance 
on it contributed to a secular rise in the rate of monetary growth. Central 
banks in a number of countries, some more willingly than others, in 
the  1970s adopted targets for monetary  growth without  necessarily 
abandoning their desire to hold down interest rates or exchange rates, 361  Evolution of the International Monetary System 
so that successful targeting has not invariably been the result. If  it was 
hoped that public announcement of targets for monetary growth would 
itself reduce expectations of inflation, the failure time after time to 
achieve the targets has diluted any possible effect on the formation of 
expectations. 
14.5  Summary 
By the end of 1958, the idealized Bretton Woods regime of exchange 
rates pegged within relatively narrow bounds seemed on the point of 
achievement. Problems arose in the 1960s when individual countries 
resorted to restrictions on trade and commodities in order to contain 
balance-of-payments  deficits which would have otherwise required lower 
rates of monetary growth and inflation. The United States, the reserve- 
currency country, was the prime destabilizer of the system. Because 
countries were unwilling to subordinate domestic monetary policies to 
the requirements of a fixed exchange-rate system, recurring financial 
crises led to occasionally large devaluations and to some revaluations 
of individual currencies. In the end, the system broke down and coun- 
tries were free after 1973 to float their currencies or to adopt regional 
pegged currency schemes that floated against the dollar. Since the float 
has been a managed system, with substantial official intervention to 
prevent or slow exchange-rate movements, countries have continued 
to hold foreign exchange reserves and internal monetary policy inde- 
pendence has not invariably produced noninflationary monetary growth. 
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1.  We  share the view of Harry G. Johnson (1978) expressed in Exchange 
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sort, of the Canadian dollar in May  1970. 
3. Laskar in chapter 11 of Darby et al. (1983) provides a particularly thorough 
econometric investigation of this sterilization question. Cassese and Lothian 
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4. Some, however, view currency substitution and asset substitution as lim- 
iting national monetary independence even under floating exchange rates. See, 
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11. Margaret de Vries (1976). 
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13. Underlying the emphasis upon international liquidity during this period 
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13). 
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Department, at hearings of the Joint Economic Committee, 4 May 1981. 
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an average annual rate of 20.7%. By comparison the total returns on common 
stock and on long-term government bonds (computed according to Ibbotson 
and Sinquefield  1977) increased  at average annual rates of 7.2% and 4.0%, 
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16. 
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